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This paper empirically analyzes how circumstances affect the creation of strategic 
alliances in the pharmaceutical industry, and the form these alliances take.  The models 
introduced in this paper use the cost of capital and monitoring costs to predict the timing 
of the deal, which in turn allows the prediction of the deal type.  The deal type is then 
used to predict payment types used in the deal.  Deals are characterized by five payment 
types; upfront, royalty, milestone, equity, and research payments. Deals are also 
characterized by one of five deal types; co-development, license, acquisition, outsource, 
and asset purchase.  Each of these is a response to a specific contracting problem such as 
cost of acquiring capital and asymmetric information.  The payment types used in 
pharmaceutical alliances are chosen to efficiently produce monitoring or purchase assets 
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The pharmaceutical industry has exhibited a major shift in business strategy over the past 
few decades.  In the late 1970's, large pharmaceutical firms began relying less on using 
high-throughput screening of chemical libraries to find treatments for human diseases, 
and relying more on structure-based drug design.  This shift in strategy caused large 
transition costs for the large pharmaceutical corporations, which were therefore slow to 
respond to the changes.  This created a cost advantage for smaller biotech firms.  Small 
biotech corporations were formed to take advantage of proprietary human capital, and 
were able to adapt to this new style of biotechnology quickly and cheaply.  When larger 
firms successfully adapted to the transition, they enjoyed economies of scale and scope 
due to their larger size and access to capital.  This created superior efficiency when 
compared to the smaller firms.  The larger firms then merged with or acquired some 
smaller firms in order to more efficiently use any proprietary information or pipeline held 
by the smaller firm (Galambos & Sturchio, 1998).  In other cases, firms formed alliances 
to co-develop specific drugs or technologies, which took advantage of the smaller firm’s 
research efficiency, and the larger firm’s low cost of capital.  This paper uses data 
collected from press releases to explore the makeup of pharmaceutical deals between 
large pharmaceutical firms, smaller pharmaceutical firms called biotechs, and 
universities.  The model predicts the timing of alliances from the size of the firms 






The following is a review of works on contracting in the pharmaceutical industry.  The 
prior research in this area focuses on the cost advantages and nature of the industry which 
make strategic alliances profitable, and the effects of these alliances after being 
undertaken.  
 
Galambos and Sturchio (1998) review the transition from pharmaceutical companies to 
the strategic alliances of large pharmaceutical and small biotechnology firms.  The 
authors of this paper suggest that biotechnology firms were able to prosper due to 
transitions costs of big pharmaceutical firms when transitioning from chemical to 
biological formulation of drugs. Originally, there was a random search of chemicals by 
pharmaceutical firms to find useable medicines.  As technology improved, specific 
problems could be solved based on more advanced knowledge of biology.  This created 
an opportunity for scientists to create new firms with proprietary human capital as the 
larger pharmaceutical firms transitioned to biotechnology.  The large pharmaceutical 
firms invested heavily in biotechnology in the 1970s and 80s and integrated with 
biotechnology firms to increase their knowledge base.  The paper by Galambos and 
Sturchio presents a background for the further examination of strategic alliances as a 
profit maximizing technique. 
 
Arora and Gambardella (1990), examine the complementarity of agreements between 
firms, research agreements with universities, investments in the capital stock of biotechs, 
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and acquisition of biotechs.  The authors conclude that the foundation for the agreements 
between large and small pharmaceutical firms is the acquisition of some rights to a 
specific downstream product or technology.  In many cases, biotechs emerge only to 
exploit a specific technology and have no intention of long term or broader research 
goals.  The research agreements between pharmaceutical firms and universities are based 
on acquiring the use of basic scientific knowledge from the university.   Acquisitions are 
used to acquire the proprietary technologies of some smaller companies or to quickly add 
a new sector to the larger firm's knowledge base.   
 
Arora and Gambardella claim that investment in equity is an attempt of the large firm to 
gain favor of the small firm in current and future rights to information and product 
licensing.  An investment in equity may also be a way of acquiring familiarity with the 
work of the biotech.  This investment in knowledge and repeat formal agreements may 
prevent moral hazard.  The strategies listed above each target a specific goal of the large 
firm to acquire tangible or intangible assets to increase efficiency and productivity of 
their firm.  They are therefore complementary, such that large firms may use each 
strategy in combination towards a specific goal while these strategies do not seem to 
necessarily be substitutes or work against one another. 
 
My paper builds on the work done by Arora and Gambardella in the area of acquisitions 
of small biotechs with propriety information.  However, I disagree with their implication 
that firms will create alliances with another firm simply to learn about the firm, or to gain 
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favor with the firm through repeated dealings.  It is my hypothesis that firms will seek to 
maximize profits regardless of previous deals.  Profits will be maximized by dealing with 
the low cost producer of capital or research. 
 
Arora, Ashish, and Gambardella (2005) claim that bigger companies gain knowledge 
about the smaller company by investing in equity.  Again, this does agree with my 
hypothesis that firms seek to maximize profits based on low cost production.  These 
authors suspect that by being a shareholder, they are privy to insider information on the 
company, can keep track of it, and be more likely to capture deals.  Information on public 
companies is publicly available, and information on private companies should be made 
available to potential investors in order to maximize the opportunities of the private firm.  
Using an investor’s capital to buy equity in the firm being researched has a high 
opportunity cost associated with it, since this capital can no longer be used to invest 
elsewhere.   
 
In the case that it is a privately held firm, or the client is researching several firms, 
information can more cheaply be obtained from firms that specialize in gather that data, 
such as recap.com, medtrack.com, datamonitor.com.  This prevents repeated search costs 
and therefore lowers overall costs of searching.  Information on a firm may also be 
obtained by researching the other deals that a firm has made (Nicholson 2005).  The 
information available through diligent research should be at a quality as high as 
information obtained by a firm that has an equity interest in the firm being researched.  If 
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this is not the case, then there is asymmetric information, which suggests inefficiency in 
the market. 
 
Arora, Ashish, and Gambardella go on to claim that an investor in a firm will be more 
likely to benefit from economies of scope, since there will be sharing of research 
information.   There is no reason to believe that there will be knowledge sharing between 
firms that is not specific to a contract unless the client firm acquires controlling interest in 
the research firm, as in acquisitions.  The benefits from all shared knowledge are 
therefore captured in the contract with no extra, uncontracted knowledge sharing between 
firms.   There may, however, be knowledge spillovers within a firm due to the acquisition 
of new technologies. 
  
Danzon, Nicholson, and Pereira, wrote Productivity in Pharmaceutical-Biotechnology 
R&D: The Role of Experience and Alliances (2003) to develop the idea of the value of 
having experience of forming and undertaking alliances. Their results suggest that returns 
to investment vary significantly according to therapeutic category, and products which 
are developed in alliances during phase 2 and 3 testing are more likely to be successful, 
especially when the licensee is large.  The authors go on to develop the idea that alliances 
can be a way of obtaining experience in an area.  Some firms may be taking on these 
deals in order to increase the value of the firm or the value of their services in the future. 
This hypothesis is supported by the finding that phase 2 testing is more likely to be 
successful if developed with therapeutic category specific experience and by firms with 
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specific rather than general experience.  The authors’ data is acquired from ADIS 
international and Windover.   
 
The paper by Danzon, Nicholson, and Periera is useful in my research as support for the 
hypothesis that later deals are associated with less risk of failure.  Less risk of failure 
leads to the prediction that the total payment will be larger, ceteris paribus, and payment 
types will be chosen with less concentration on the reduction of monitoring costs.  
 
Danzon, Epstein, and Nicholson, discuss the combination of firms in Mergers and 
Acquisitions in the Pharmaceutical and Biotech Industries (2004).  This research is a 
starting point for the explanation of the observed trend in acquisitions in my paper.  The 
authors show that "mergers are a response to excess capacity due to anticipated patent 
expirations and gaps in a company's product pipeline."  For large firms, a gap in the 
product pipeline means that human and physical capital are not being used efficiently.  
When faced with an empty pipeline, a pharmaceutical corporation could reduce staff and 
sell assets to avoid merging. This would involve the loss of quasi rents from investment 
in human and physical capital (Oi, 1962).  By buying another firm's pipeline through 
merging or acquiring that firm, the purchasing firm can utilize their resources more 
efficiently.  Acquisition is therefore a mechanism to transfer assets to more efficient uses 
or management, and may be cheaper than attempting to create them in-house.  For the 
smaller firm being merged or acquired, the merger is an exit strategy.  Small firms, 
defined here as greater than $20 million in sales, but less than $1 billion in enterprise 
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value have the propensity to be acquired if they are financially weak.  Financially strong 
firms are more likely not to engage in M&A at all. 
 
Merged firms had slower growth than similar, unmerged, firms in the third year 
following a merger, showing that although merging is a response to distress, it may not 
be a solution.  Small firms that merge have slower R&D growth than similar firms, 
suggesting that integration may divert cash from R&D. Horizontal mergers are 
rationalized on the basis of the research intensity undertaken by the pharmaceutical 
industry, which averages R&D to sales ratio of 18% compared to 4% for the US 
manufacturing industry overall (PhRMA). 
 
Nicholson, Danzon, and McCullough continue the development of the idea of alliances 
building firm value and evaluate the possibility of asymmetric information in the market 
for pharmaceutical alliances in Biotech-Pharmaceutical Alliances as a Signal of Asset 
and Firm Quality (2005).  Asymmetric information will affect market valuation of firms.  
The authors examine whether drugs developed in an alliance are more likely to succeed, 
or whether there is a lemons problem.  The lemons problem (Pisano, 1997) suggests that 
the less successful drugs are out-licensed due to asymmetric information between 
pharmaceutical firms.  The data, however, does not support this.  In 1998, biotechs raised 
three times as much from alliances with pharmaceutical companies ($6.2 billion) as from 
the private and public equity markets combined.  This supports the hypothesis maintained 
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in my paper, which states that deals are not made in order to sell off failing products, but 
rather to take advantage of comparative advantage. 
 
The analysis finds that biotech firms receive a 47% discount on their first deal relative to 
firms that have signed at least two prior deals, and 28% on the second deal.  This 
discount is not consistent with the post deal performance of the drug.  The authors 
therefore reject the lemons hypothesis.  The discount is due to asymmetric information 
and making this deal, despite the discount, is valuable to the biotech because it signals 
value to the financial market, and increases the value of subsequent deals.  The authors 
therefore find that there is value to the biotech of signaling to the financial market, but 
since experienced biotechs continue to make alliances, there must also be some 
advantage due to comparative advantage of different sized firms.   
 
Aghion and Tirole wrote The Management of Innovation (1994) which discusses the cost 
of capital as it applies to highly human capital intensive industries. They find that firms in 
industries that require large amounts of human capital relative to physical and financial 
capital will have research performed by independent units.  Each aspect of production can 
be performed by the firm with the comparative advantage, creating high competition 
among researchers. This theory of comparative advantage and specialization due to cost 
of capital and ownership of human capital is the foundation for creating a strategic 




Lerner and Merges wrote The control of Technology Alliances: An Empirical Analysis of 
the Biotechnology Industry (1998), to test the Aghion- Tirole theory that the researcher's 
control will be positively correlated with the researcher's financial resources in the 
biotechnology industry. This paper uses three case studies and a quantitative analysis of 
200 alliances.  The authors find that it is the researcher’s financial condition rather than 
the interest of maximizing joint value.  This supports the Aghion and Tirole theory that 
control will be positively correlated with researcher’s financial capital.  
 
Civan and Maloney seek to support their theory that drug development responds to 
consumer demand in their paper The Determinants of Pharmaceutical Research and 
Development Investments (2006).  These authors find that characteristics of the disease 
other than demand for the drug in the United States does not motivate the production of 
research and development of drugs.  Changes in policy that affect demand or quantity 
demanded or supplied of drugs in the U.S. will affect drug development, and could 
reduce the amount of drug development.  Allowing the importation of drugs from other 
countries at lower prices could be detrimental to drug development. 
 
Civan and Maloney continue the development of their hypothesis by testing the effect of 
prices of existing drugs on the number of drugs in the development pipeline in The Effect 
of Price on Pharmaceutical R&D (2007).  The authors found a significant positive 
correlation between prices and number of drugs in pipeline. As cheaper drugs are 
imported to the United States from other countries, either as a patent infringement or due 
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to price discrimination, the drug pipeline will suffer.  By looking at changes in prices of 
drugs and pipeline drugs in specific disease markets, the authors find the elasticity of 
supply of pipeline drugs to be between 28 and 49%.  The authors therefore suggest that a 
higher market price of drugs increases incentive to produce research and development, 
and so the pharmaceutical market faces and upward sloping supply curve for research and 
development.  My paper discusses the falling costs of producing research due to alliances 
with biotechs which have a comparative advantage in early stage development.  The 
papers by Civan and Maloney support the theory that alliances are necessary to maintain 
competitiveness in the market.  
 
Grabowski and Vernon claim in Consumer Protection Regulation in Ethical Drugs 
(1977), that part of the cause of the shrinking number of pharmaceutical firms in the US 
is that the more stringent regulation on the US pharmaceutical market is creating a barrier 
to entry.  This paper was written in 1977 before the biotech boom.   
 
Grabowski, Vernon, and Thomas wrote Estimating the Effects of Regulation on 
Innovation: an International Comparative Analysis of the Pharmaceutical Industry 
(1978), and show that while R&D expenditures increase, new drug introductions 
(including only new chemical entities, not new dosages or new brand names) decreased.  
Possible causes of this are listed as;  
1.  Increased regulation of the industry due to the 1962 amendments to the Federal Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act 
11 
 
2.  The effect is illusory because only ineffective new chemical entities have declined 
3.  A depletion or research opportunities 
4.  The thalidomide incident caused doctors and firms to be more cautious 
5.  Costs have risen as a result of advances in the technology of safety testing. 
 
Their conclusions are that while costs in the US rose, costs in the UK which are not 
affected by the 1962 amendments also rose significantly.  This means that there may be a 
depletion of research opportunities, but there is another force causing the decrease in 
introductions in the US.  These authors fail to capture the causes of the rising prices and 
falling number of new chemical entities, but do show empirically that this is occurring.  
Since ceteris paribus is violated by the uses of the chemical entities and the technology 
used to create them, the analysis becomes more difficult.  This paper is useful in my 
research as support for the theory that new chemical entities become more expensive to 
produce, after adjusting for inflation, in later years. 
 
Cockburn, and Henderson write in Scale, Scope, and Spillovers: The Determinants of 
Research Productivity in Drug Discovery (1996) that larger pharmaceutical companies 
enjoy economies of scale and also economies of scope due to knowledge spillovers.  A 
firm with intellectual property and human capital can use these in the research for a 
greater number of drugs or technologies than a smaller firm. This means that a larger 
corporation can more cheaply produce drugs thanks to better access to cheap information, 
marketing, capital, and equipment.  This research is especially important in my analysis 
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of acquisitions.  An acquisition or asset purchase may occur due to the purchaser’s 
greater perceived potential profits.  These greater profits stem from the lower costs 
associated with economies of scale and scope. 
 
Turning to contracting, there two seminal papers on the efficiency of contracting.  Ronald 
Coase claims in The Nature of the Firm (1937), that contracting is due to transactions 
costs.  He relates this to the purchase of fisher body by GM.  Klein, Crawford and 
Alchian add to the theory in Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the 
Competitive Contracting Process, 1978.  These authors write that a contracting firm may 
be used rather than independent workers because the firm fears it will be cheated via a 
hold up.  Klein calls this “post contractual opportunistic behavior.”  Klein claims this is 
the reason GM bought Fisher Body.  Both cases are useful in my evaluation of 





The data analyzed in this paper was collected from Deloitte Recap LLC (Recap.com, 
2007).  This is a subscription website that owns a proprietary, searchable dataset 
comprised of press releases about pharmaceutical alliances.  I read through the press 
releases to obtain all public information on these alliances. Recap designated each 
alliance as a co-development, license, acquisition, outsource, asset purchase or 
distribution based on the information available.  Each firm was designated by Recap as 
large pharmaceutical, biotech, or university.  The dataset consists of 270 pharmaceutical 
deals.  These deals span the five years of January 2003 to December 2007.  The data are 
only for the following diseases; diabetes, cardiovascular, and respiratory related drugs 
and technologies.  I have only included deals for which some financial information about 
the deal was made available.  
 
Financial data on the firms was gathered from the press releases, Google Finance, Yahoo 
Finance, and CRSP and Compustat.  The financial data of publicly traded firms is 
required by the Securities and Exchange Commission to be made publicly available.  
Market cap was found by multiplying stock price by number of shares.  When obtaining 
this data, many stock prices were available for the day that the deal took place, but some 
were available monthly.  In these cases, the closest date available was used.  Some 
privately owned firms may have some information available such that firms or investors 
have information signaling the viability of current and future investments in that firm.  In 
the cases in which a firm is acquired, information about the price paid for that firm will 
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sometimes be available.  Although the firm may have been acquired at a premium or 
discount, the price paid is usually the best indication available of the value of that firm. In 
many cases, no data was available concerning the market cap of private firms, so these 
data are treated as missing.    
 
Firm types are described in this paper as researcher and client, or purchaser and 
acquired firm.  The researcher is the developer of the drug or technology in the early 
stages of development, and in every case except an outsourced research deal, is the owner 
of the intellectual property.  The client in these cases is the firm which pays the 
researcher for rights to the intellectual property being developed.  In the case of 
acquisitions, the firms are described as purchaser and acquired firms, rather than 
researcher and client. 
 
There are several types of payments used in these pharmaceutical alliances.  These are 
not mutually exclusive payments, so may occur alone or together.   The client will 
contract using these payments to prevent moral hazard and align the incentives of the 
researcher with its own.  The researcher, if it owns the intellectual property (IP), will 
attempt to sell its intellectual property for economic profit after accounting for cost of 
capital and drug-specific risk.   
 
The types of payments paid by the client to the researcher are organized as equity, 
royalty, milestone, research, and upfront payments.  Equity is a purchase of ownership in 
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the researcher.  Equity is a share of a firm, and in the case that equity in the researcher is 
purchased, the equity provides the client with some profit sharing in successes of the 
researcher, and the researcher with capital.  Research payments are cash payments by the 
client to the researcher in the case that the client owns the intellectual property, but 
wishes to outsource some of the research work to another firm. Upfront payments are 
cash payments from the client to the researcher without contractual conditions being met.  
Milestone payments are payments by the client to the researcher in exchange for 
contractual requirements being met.  Royalty payments are payments by the client to the 
researcher to provide the researcher with a residual claim on the product being produced. 
Acquisition payments may consist of cash payments and payments in terms of shares of 
stock of the acquiring firm.  These payments are separated from other types of payments 
as acquisition payments. 
 
In this study, five types of deals are evaluated; license, asset purchase, co-development, 
outsource and acquisition1.  These deal types are mutually exclusive.  Licenses are the 
purchase of the use of a specified drug or technology, whether exclusively or non-
exclusively licensed worldwide or in a geographic region.  Licenses usually mean that 
some ownership rests with the original holder of the intellectual property.  An asset 
purchase is the purchase of a product or group of products, which could be drugs, 
technologies, or other capital.  No ownership rests with the seller in this case, so this is an 
outright purchase.  Co-development is an effort between two firms which involves 
                                                           
1
 Of the 270 deals, there were 8 deals that did not fit into these five categories. 
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payments from the client firm to the researcher, and transfer of some of the intellectual 
property rights from the researcher to the client.  An acquisition is the purchase of all 
equity of a firm.  Outsource is a deal for which the intellectual property holder outsources 
some work to another firm, usually in exchange for cash or milestone payments.  
Outsource is a special case in which the client is the intellectual property holder.   
 
One of the characteristics of the deals involves the stage of development of the research.  
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA), imposes strict controls on the development 
and testing of new pharmaceuticals to ensure safety and efficacy.   It is important to 
understand the course that a drug or technology follows during the development and 
testing phases.  On average, it will take 10-15 years for an experimental drug to get from 
the lab to patients. One out of five thousand compounds make it to human testing from 
preclinical testing.  Of these, one in five is approved for sale.  This process costs, on 
average, 802 million dollars per new medicine (Tufts, 1998). 
 
The first step is preclinical testing, which involves laboratory and animal studies.  The 
specific stages include formulation of new compounds, determining a lead molecule, and 
discovery of a potentially usable new drug.  This process takes about 6.5 years. After this, 
an investigational new drug application (IND) is filed at the FDA.  If the FDA does not 




The second step is clinical trials.  The phase one and two trials take about 1.5 and 2-3 
years, respectively, and involve a few healthy and few patient volunteers.  Phase three 
takes about 3.5 years, and is much more expensive to undertake, and includes a large 
number of patient volunteers to confirm effectiveness and monitor possible long term 
adverse reactions (PhRMA). 
 
If all of these phases are passed, the firm requests a New Drug Application (NDA) or 
Biologic License Application (BLA).  A BLA is used when the new formulation is a 
therapeutic DNA plasmid product, therapeutic synthetic peptide product of 40 or fewer 
amino acids, monoclonal antibody product for in vivo use, or therapeutic recombinant 
DNA-derived product (FDA, 2008).  The firm gathers all of its information, sometimes 
100,000 pages or more, and submits this to the FDA, which analyzes the information 
over the period of about 1.5 years. If the FDA approves the NDA/BLA, the drug is 
approved, and may be available for physicians to prescribe.  The producing company 





The maintained hypothesis of this paper is that firms do not always have the most cost 
effective means to fully develop a new drug or technology from start to finish.  A firm 
that has initiated research or development of a new drug could attempt to continue 
development on its own by using its own resources, obtaining capital privately from 
venture capitalists, incurring debt, or publicly by selling shares of equity.  The other 
option is to enter into an agreement with another firm, which could include continuing 
the development as an alliance, selling the existing assets, or being acquired completely.  
The decisions made will be based on the likelihood of success of development, the cost to 
the researching firm of acquiring capital, and the cost of information gathering and 
monitoring of the researching firm.  If a contract is made, the contract will consist of a 
nexus of payments which attempt to align the incentives of the client and researching 
firm.   
 
Table 1 shows the possible observations at each stage of an alliance.  The IP owner and 
the cost of capital of the firms involved are taken as exogenous.  After this, timing can be 
predicted by the model set up in this paper.  The model then predicts type of deal from 
the timing, and payment types from the deal type. 
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Table 1 – Data Observations 
IP Owner  Cost of 
Capital 
 Timing of 
Deal 

























It is first important to note the owner of the intellectual property.  If the researcher owns 
the intellectual property (IP), then some part of the IP will be sold to the client as part of 
the deal, and financing will be provided to the researcher.  If the client owns the IP, then 
it is likely that the client is outsourcing some of the research to the researcher. This type 
of deal is referred to as an outsource deal.  I do not have information on the IP owner, so I 
assume that an outsource deal is due to the client owning the IP. 
 
The model proposed in this paper predicts that the cost of capital is a strong predictor of 
the timing of deals.  Aghion and Tirole (1998) wrote that in a human capital intensive 
industry such as biotechnology, the large firms will purchase research from smaller firms 
which have a comparative advantage in production.  The large firms, with cheap access to 
capital, are the buyer of research, and the biotechs specialize in specific areas.  The large 
firm, thanks to large amounts of financial capital, has a comparative advantage in 
organizing the smaller firms, and marketing and distributing the products once they have 
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been approved by the FDA.  A small firm with very little capital to invest into the 
development of a drug (Lerner & Merges, 1998) should therefore be interested in forming 
a strategic alliance with a larger firm that can cheaply acquire capital, as well as the 
larger firm being interested in acquiring the IP from the smaller firm.   
 
Shirking costs are associated with all contracting arrangements and are come into play in 
the decision to form a drug development alliance.  The larger firms are interested in doing 
business with the smaller firms partly because shirking costs are reduced when a smaller, 
more efficient command and control exists.  Fewer managers and better alignment of 
incentives creates a more efficient system of production.  In franchising of stores, much 
like the outsourcing of research explored in this paper, we see large firms passing control 
to individual owner-operators.  The firm expects that the increase in efficiency and 
subsequent high royalty payments received will offset the forgone profits from operating 
the store directly.2  
 
Monitoring costs (Barzel, 1982) are the costs of overseeing work done by another firm.  
In the case of strategic alliances, a large part of this monitoring cost will be measurement 
of the value of production of the researcher firm.  The researching firm may also take 
payments, but not expend resources to produce a valuable product, thereby creating a 
moral hazard problem.  Payment types may be selected for the contract in order to reduce 
                                                           
2
 (Kaufmann & Lafontaine, 1994), (Klein, Crawford, & Alchian, 1978) (Mathewson & 
Winter, 1985) (Rubin, 1978) 
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monitoring costs, such that the researcher has incentive to reduce shirking and produce a 
valuable product.  Monitoring costs may also be reduced by selling equity to a single 
buyer or creating an alliance with a single buyer such that only a single buyer must 
expend resources to monitor the researcher (Brealey & Myers, 1991). 
 
The value of a product may differ by firm.  In the case that neither firm has capital, 
monitoring, or shirking cost advantages, a deal may occur due to differences in value of 
the product.  This means that the product maybe sold or licensed to the highest valuing 
firm to profit both firms.  This will maximize the value of the IP.   The transfer of the IP 
may be motivated by the gain or loss of human capital, such as the gain or loss to the firm 
of a scientist or group of scientists. In a simple example, a group of diseases specific 
specialists may be hired to a small firm and away from another small firm.   The small 
firm that acquired the human capital may choose to license or purchase an IP from the 
other firm in order to continue research in the area in which it now has a comparative 
advantage. 
 
The previous few paragraphs have explained that the characteristics of drug development 
alliances will be driven by cost of capital, difference in value of the commercial potential 
of the research, and the contractual issues of shirking and monitoring. The next several 
sections of this paper will describe how these costs lead to the formation of the timing of 




Contracting- Prediction of Timing of Deal 
The timing of deals will be driven by cost of capital, monitoring costs, shirking costs, and 
differences in value.  To further analyze this by client and researcher type, Table 2 
depicts where we can expect to see deviations in these costs between small and large 
clients and researchers that drive the timing of the deal. 
 
Table 2 - Analysis of Cost of Capital, Monitoring Costs, and Shirking for a Small 
Researcher and Large Client 
 
Early 
Cost of Capital; low for client, higher for researcher than in late deal 
Monitoring; early deal occurs if monitoring and measurement costs are low 
for client 
Shirking; low for researcher, high for client 
 
Late 
Cost of Capital; low for client, lower for researcher than in early deal 3 
Monitoring; late deal will occur if monitoring and measurement costs are 
high for client 
Shirking; low for researcher, high for client 
 
Early deals are driven by cost of capital, monitoring, and shirking costs.  When the 
researcher is the IP owner, during any point in the development process, the researching 
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 Although cost of capital is noted as “high” for researcher, and “low” for client in both early and late 
cases, it is of note that this is a sliding scale such that the researcher is expected to have a high cost of 




firm may decide to sell the existing assets, be acquired, or take on a partner in the 
development.  Taking on a partner requires the small firm to sell some of the IP. This 
leaves the small researcher with a smaller investment at risk of loss, but smaller profits in 
the case of a success.  When the small researching firm finds it more profitable to sell 
some IP in exchange for operating capital rather than attempting to borrow the capital, 
the model predicts that an early stage strategic alliance will be observed. 
 
In addition to easy access to financial capital, larger firms enjoy economies of scale in 
manufacturing, and economies of scope in distribution and marketing.  Having the 
avenues already set up, larger firms can more cheaply add another drug to the market.  In 
this case, these two firms could form a symbiosis to cheaply and profitably create a new 
product by specializing in the area in which they have a comparative advantage.  
 
Monitoring costs of the researcher by the client are described as high when the output of 
the researcher is costly to measure.  This problem creates incentive for the client to 
contract a payment structure that induces the researcher to monitor itself.  If it is too 
costly to measure the product or create a contract, the client may choose to wait until later 
stages of development to make a deal, in which case the value of the product will be 
easier to measure.  Relative to other deals, ceteris paribus, one for which an early deal is 




Shirking costs are lower for the small researcher than would be the case, ceteris paribus, 
for a large researcher.  Internal monitoring is less efficient when performed by salaried 
managers or managers with a small residual claim to a large firm, than by managers with 
a large residual claim of a small firm or owner operators.  This is because the marginal 
benefit of an hour of work is higher to the worker when that worker owns a larger 
residual claim (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972).  
 
Late deals are also driven by cost of capital, monitoring, and shirking costs, but the model 
predicts a late deal to occur between small researcher and large client in the case that the 
small researcher has a higher market cap relative to other small researchers, or 
measurement of the product is costly.   
 
The size of the researcher carries more information than simply small or large.  A very 
small researcher is predicted to seek an alliance much earlier than a relatively large 
researcher.  Even in cases that the researcher is relatively small when compared to the 
client, the researcher’s cost of capital may be low enough to support development into 
late phase testing before taking on an alliance with a client that has a comparative 
advantage in marketing and distribution.  This paper will develop a model that will 
predict likelihood of an early deal compared to a late deal based on market cap, which is 




Measurement costs of assets are lower in later stages.  If the deal occurred in a late stage, 
that may be a signal that the cost of evaluating the product in an early stage was higher 
than the benefit of doing so, so the client chose not to invest until evaluation became less 
expensive.  There may therefore be a correlation between late stage deals and higher 
monitoring costs, although the late stage deal is not the cause of high monitoring costs.  
 
Deals for which there is not a small researcher and large client will be driven due to a 
difference in value of products by the two firms.  A small researcher, small client deal 
will happen early if it is an outsource deal, or late if there is a transfer of assets or licenses 
due to a difference in value of the assets between the two firms.  It is plausible that a 
small firm will buy a license from another firm, regardless of the size of that second firm, 
if that license is necessary to complement or complete development of a pipeline drug.   
 
For a large researcher and large client deal, the transaction takes place due to the differing 
valuation of the asset between the two firms.  The difference in value may stem from the 
differing use of the drug.  In the case that a researcher has found a new use for a molecule 
or technology that has been patented by another firm, the researcher will acquire or 
license the IP to use for the new indication.  Most other cases will involve the researcher 
using the IP to complete a pipeline drug or technology.   
 
If the sizes of the large client and large researcher are relatively similar, there will not be 
a large enough difference in cost of capital to cause a deal.  Due to the lack of substantial 
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difference in cost of capital, the model predicts that the researcher will not take on an 
early deal.  The researcher will complete the development and testing of the product, and 
will engage in a late deal if offered a price for the asset or a license which is estimated to 
result in economic profit.   
 
Contracting – Prediction of the Type of Deal 
The above analysis predicts the timing of deals.  The model predicts that the type of deal 
will be determined by the timing of the deal.  An early deal will involve higher 
monitoring and measurement costs due to asymmetric information and high likelihood of 
failure of the product.  The contract created for an early deal will involve a structure and 
payment types that align incentives and lower monitoring costs.  Late deals will involve 
products which are easier to measure.  These late deals will have a contract structure that 
is oriented towards cash payments to transfer the ownership of an IP rather than incentive 
alignment and monitoring.   
 
Outsource deals are deals in which the client owns the IP, and is outsourcing research to 
firms that have a comparative advantage in its production.  These deals usually happen 
early, but can happen early or late and are easy to measure and monitor.  In this case, it is 
arguable that the timing of the deal, the deal type, and the payment type are determined 




Co-development deals consist of two firms investing resources into the joint development 
of a product.  The cause of this type of deal is the high cost of capital faced by the 
researching firm.  A very high cost of capital, as discussed in the previous section, may 
cause the strategic alliance to occur early.  An early strategic alliance, if not an outsource 
deal, is a deal in which the client provides funding and the researcher completes early 
stage development, which is called co-development.  It would be illogical to purchase the 
asset in the early stages, since the researcher owns the human capital which is producing 
the asset, and the smaller size of the researcher indicates lower shirking costs, so lower 
costs of early stage development.   
 
An asset purchase is the outright purchase of another firm’s human or physical capital, 
drug, or technology.  The seller maintains no residual claim.  This product is likely to be 
approved or near approval, since it would make more sense to co-develop if the product 
were in early stages.  The purchase may also be of a firm’s entire series of drugs or 
technology, which we cannot describe as “early” or “late” since there are varying degrees 
of completion of pipeline drugs and technologies.  If another firm is already producing 
products like it, or already have avenues of production set up, the purchasing firm may 
achieve economies of scale and produce with lower cost.  The purchasing firm may also 
be able to market the product with other products like it, thereby achieving economies of 
scope. 
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In the case of a license, the seller maintains some residual claim.  The seller receives 
some payment in exchange for the buyer to use or sell a drug or technology for a specific 
indication or in a specified geographic market.  These products are approved or near 
approval.  Like asset purchases, it would make more sense to co-develop if the product 
were in the early stages.  The buyer may be any size firm, using the drug or technology to 
complete their product or use it for a different purpose than it is currently approved.  The 
seller may receive royalties on sales as the residual claim. These royalties provide the 
seller with incentive to maintain the value of the license.  By selling a license rather than 
an asset purchase, the seller maintains some rights and may continue development of the 
licensed drug or technology, and re-license an improved version. 
 
Klein, Crawford, and Alchian claim that when one firm has invested resources, in this 
case the client, there is the potential for a hold-up, which they call “post contractual 
opportunistic behavior.” In an attempt to minimize risk of loss through this type of 
problem, the client will contract with payment types that minimize monitoring costs, and 
align incentives between the two firms. Table 3 shows which payments we are likely to 
see given both timing and deal type. 
 
Contracting - Deal Type Determines Payments Types 
The model predicts that payment types are determined by deal type.  Because the model 
predicts that the deal type is determined directly by the timing of the deal, and the timing 
is determined by the cost of capital and monitoring costs, all of these attributes are 
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captured when predicting payment type.  All deals involve the transfer of some monetary 
asset for some intellectual property or services. Acquisitions are made up of payments 
from the purchaser to the acquired firm for the acquired firm’s assets. The payments can 
consist of cash or equity in the acquiring firm. These are called acquisition payments in 
this paper.  Because these payments are used in every acquisition and there is no 
associated timing with acquisitions, the analysis of acquisitions is treated separately.  
Similarly, outsource deals involve some cash payment generally on a periodic basis over 
the life of the research contract. These payments are designated as research payments. 
 
For co-development, asset purchases, and license agreements, I expect that there will be 
some payment upfront, and for co-development and license agreements, some payment 
through the life of the contract.  When the upfront payment is cash paid at one time, and 
is not a research payment, I call the payment upfront.  For some deals, the client will buy 
an equity share in the research firm for an upfront payment of cash.  I call these payments 
equity.  For many of these deals, these payments will be extended over the life of the 
contract. One way this is designated in the financial press is by the use of the word 
milestone payments. These are payments that are made when certain events occur in the 
development of the IP.  I label these payments as milestone.   Alternatively, for some 
deals, the extended payments will take the form of royalties on the sale of the IP to users. 
I call these payments royalties.  Table 3 displays the type of payments predicted to be 




Table 3 - Payment Type by Type of Deal 


























Outsource deals are deals in which the client owns the IP, unlike other deal types, and 
outsources research to another firm that can perform it more cheaply.  This is low-level 
work for which the value is relatively easy to measure, so cash payments can be made 
upfront. 
  
Early deals in which the researcher owns the IP, but has a high cost of capital, are 
predicted to be co-development deals.   These deals are the exchange of early financing to 
the researcher for late phase IP to the client.  In this type of early deal, there will exist a 
high cost of measurement of the product being produced, and a high risk of failure of the 
product.  Equity purchases are likely to occur in this case.  The equity purchase allows 
                                                           
4
 Research payments are cash payments by the client to the researcher in the case that the client owns the intellectual property. 
5
 Equity is a purchase of ownership in the researcher. 
6
 Milestone payments are payments by the client to the researcher in exchange for contractual requirements being met. 
7
 Royalty payments are payments by the client to the researcher to provide the researcher with a residual claim on the product being 
produced. 
8
 Upfront payments are cash payments from the client to the researcher without contractual conditions being met. 
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the investing firm to share profits without incurring prohibitive measurement costs 
(Barzel, 1982), and without being able to accurately estimate the value of the product 
being developed ex ante.  Any profitable technology or product that results from the 
investment will benefit the investing firm.   
 
In co-development deals for which the client is able to more easily measure the product, 
milestone payments will be used to monitor the researcher’s progress.  Like equity and 
royalties, milestone payments provide monitoring through financial means.  The 
researcher is contractually obligated to meet specific goals to receive payment, and may 
be punished if it fails to do so.  Milestone payments may be used in early or late deals as 
a source of monitoring and financing.  As the financing is a prize for completed work, 
rather than an upfront payment to provide the work, milestones are likely to be used as a 
complement to another type of financing such as equity or upfront payments.   If the 
goals are met, the milestones are paid to the researcher.  If the researcher fails to produce 
research in a timely manner, the contract stipulates a punishment. 
 
For later co-development deals, or for co-development deals that involve an easily valued 
product, equity payments may be replaced by royalty and upfront payments.  Royalty 
payments, like equity payments, are intended to resolve problems associates with 
asymmetric information.  Royalty payments, however, are specific to a single product, 
rather than all products of a firm, so will be more profitable to the researcher than equity 
payments in the case that the product is a success.  The researcher receives a residual 
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claim to the product, and therefore gains incentive to ensure its viability in the 
marketplace.  This effectively lowers the costs to the client of measuring the value of the 
product and monitoring the researcher in the face of asymmetric information.   
 
Upfront payments may be required by the researcher in a co-development deal in addition 
to some combination of royalty, milestone, and equity payments.  Upfront payments are 
cash payments without the contractual obligation associated with milestone payments. 
This is guaranteed payment to the researcher, usually supplied to the researcher only in 
the case that the product is late in development.  It is therefore easier to value and has a 
low risk of failure. 
 
In co-development deals, the contract usually stipulates that the ownership of the 
intellectual property reverts back to the researcher if the client fails to make progress in 
testing, development, and production.  This provides incentive to the client to continue 
development in a timely manner.  Timely production is valuable to the researcher, since 
the researcher may receive royalties or some revenue stream upon manufacture and sale 
of the product. 
 
Asset purchases are purchases for which no residual ownership rights are left with the 
seller.  These deals are therefore predicted to be paid in cash.  In the case that milestone 
payments are used, a contract exists that requires the researcher with a nearly complete 




The licensing of a product is the purchase of some rights, but a residual claim rests with 
the seller.  Licensing of a product involves some asymmetric information, as the producer 
of the license may own the human capital that produced the IP.  The patent life of the 
product may be difficult to measure by the client, such that a license involving profit 
sharing will be preferred to a cash payment.  The client will therefore be faced with 
incentive to incorporate payments that reduce monitoring and measurement costs.  
Royalty payments leave a residual claim to revenues with the researcher, providing the 
researcher with incentive to create a valuable product.  Upfront payments will likely also 
be required by the researcher as a source of upfront financing to recoup expenses and 
finance future endeavors.  
 
Contracting – Acquisitions 
As an alternative to co-development or an asset purchase, a larger firm may decide to 
acquire a smaller firm.  The chance of an acquisition increases if the larger firm wishes to 
buy a pipeline or the human capital to either create a new division in its own firm or fill a 
gap in its production line.  Purchasing the assets and pipeline of a smaller firm may be 
cheaper than attempting to co-develop with the firm and monitor their actions.  An 
acquisition can also reduce monitoring costs in the interest of maintaining the value of the 
patent which was purchased or developed with another firm.  If the human capital is not 
absorbed, there is a chance that the smaller firm will create a patent that trumps the 




The larger firms are more likely to have multiple uses of the technology acquired.  The 
technology may improve the production or application of several products, rather than the 
relatively few for which it was designed by the acquired firm.  These multiple uses create 
economies of scale for the acquiring firm.   
 
The model I set forth here predicts that smaller firms, with their higher cost of capital, 
will be acquired by relatively larger firms.  Acquisitions are the purchase by one firm of 
all equity in another firm.  This purchase can be completed with the buyer paying by cash 
or by transferring equity from the acquiring firm to the owners of the acquired firm, or 
some combination of these payments. These cash and equity payments are referred to as 
“acquisition payments” throughout the paper, so as not to be confused with equity 
payments from the client to the researcher.  Because of the difference in payment 
structure and there being no phase of testing associated with acquisitions, these deals are 




ANALYSIS OF THE DATA 
In the following few sections, the data is analyzed in the same order as discussed in the 
previous sections.  First, summary data is introduced.  After this, the timing of the deal is 
analyzed as a function of researcher market cap.  Next, the type of deal is analyzed as a 
function of the timing of the deal.  The types of payments are analyzed as a function of 
the type of deal.  Finally, acquisitions are analyzed separately as a function of researcher 
market cap. 
Marginal effects from a logistic or multinomial logistic regression are used in many of 
these tables, as noted in the table titles.  The marginal effects were obtained using a code  
in a statistical analysis program which calculates the average of discrete and partial 
changes over all observations, rather than computing the marginal effects at the means of 
the variables.   This will be especially helpful when the independent variable is a dummy 
variable. 
Table 4 contains information about deal types by payment types, regardless of whether 
timing data were available.  Table 5 contains data on all timing data known for the deals. 
There were not timing data for all observations, so the summation of early and late deals 
for each deal type in Table 5 may not match the total number of deals in Table 4.  Table 6 
contains the number of times the client and researcher were observed to be a large 
pharmaceutical firm, a biotech, or a university.  Table 7 is a table of deals by partner.  




Table 4 - Deal Types by Payment Types 
 
Total Equity  Royalty Milestone Research Upfront 
Acq 
Payment 
Acquisition 46 0 0 0 0 0 46 
Asset Purchase 39 9 13 10 0 31 0 
Co-Development 115 32 58 84 21 72 0 
License 55 6 28 28 1 28 0 
Outsource 7 1 0 3 3 1 0 
Option 2 2 1 1 0 1 0 
Distribution 6 0 1 1 0 1 0 
  






Table 4A - Deal Types by Payment Types – Early Phase 
 
Total Equity  Royalty Milestone Research Upfront 
Acq 
Payment 
Asset Purchase 7 3 3 2 0 6 0 
Co-Development 71 21 40 52 17 40 0 
License 16 1 9 9 1 6 0 
Outsource 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Option 2 2 1 1 0 1 0 
Distribution 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  
Total 100 27 53 64 19 53 0 
 
 
Table 4B - Deal Types by Payment Types – Late Phase 
 
Total Equity  Royalty Milestone Research Upfront 
Acq 
Payment 
Asset Purchase 16 5 6 5 0 14 0 
Co-Development 34 10 15 30 3 30 0 
License 35 4 17 19 0 20 0 
Outsource 3 1 0 2 2 1 0 
Option 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Distribution 3 0 1 1 0 1 0 
  




Table 5 - Deal Type by Phase of Testing 
Early Late 
Asset Purchase 7 16 
Co-Development 71 34 
License 16 35 
Outsource 2 3 
Option 2 0 
Distribution 2 3 
Total 100 91 
Notes: Early is before phase 2 testing.  Timing is not known 
for all deals.  Acquisition deals are omitted because multiple 
products are being acquired.  Timing for acquisitions is 
therefore not defined 
 
 Table 6 - Deals by Type of Client and Researcher 
Client  Researcher 
Large Pharma 131 Large Pharma 20 
Biotech 124 Biotech 247 
University 15 University 3 
Total 270 Total 270 
 
Table 7 – Deals by Partner 
 Client Pharma Client Biotech Client University 
Researcher Pharma 15 5 0 
Researcher Biotech 114 118 15 




Analysis - Timing of Deal as a Function of Size of Firm 
The model predicts that the timing of the deal will be a function of the size of the 
researching firm {Timing(Rsize, e)}.  Summary statistics of the market cap of researchers 
and clients for which timing of the deal is known are presented in Table 8.  In Table 9, 
The tabulations of observations from biotech and pharma researchers and clients and 
shown for each of the three main deal types.  These numbers give some indication of the 
significance of the results found in Table 11.  Table 10 predicts the results of table 11, 
which presents the results of a logistic regression of market cap on the early dummy 
variable. 
 
Table 8 - Summary Statistics of Firm Market Cap 
Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Researcher Market Cap 102 8538.23 406.13 26602.84 8.68 193854.9 
Client Market Cap 112 36402.58 10415.42 58998.25 4.14 339408.6 





Table 9  - Tabulation of Observations for which Timing and Market Cap Data 
are Known. 
 Co-development License Asset Purchase 












































121.878 58.926 44.766 
Client/Researcher 
Ratio Range 
Min:  0.020 
Max: 1182.024 
35 observations 











Table 10 – Prediction of Marginal Effects from a Logistic Regression of Client and 
Researcher Market Cap on Early Dummy 
 
Dependent Variable: Early Dummy 
Independent Variable:  
Log Client Mkt Cap 
(millions of $) 
Positive 
Log Researcher Mkt Cap  
(millions of $) 
Negative 
 
The model predicts that the log client market cap will have a positive coefficient.  This is 
the prediction that larger client firms will tend to make earlier deals.  This is because 
larger clients should be interested in creating a co-development deal with smaller firms.  
These larger firms have a lower cost of capital, and can afford the early stage, high risk, 
high return investments. Later deals are predicted to involve a mix of large and small 
clients, since some small and mid-sized firms will be interested in licensing and 
purchasing assets from researching firms.  This can be to complete a pipeline or make use 
of economies of scope of the purchased or licensed technology. 
 
The model also predicts that log researcher market cap will have a negative coefficient.  
This is the prediction that smaller researcher firms will tend to make earlier deals.  These 
researcher firms act in this way because their cost of capital is higher than the larger 
firms’.  The smaller firms, at some point in development, either fail to acquire new 
operating capital, or find it too costly.  When the marginal cost of acquiring capital 
exceeds the marginal benefit, the researcher may engage in a co-development deal.   It is 
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of note that the considerations in marginal decision making include firm-specific risk 
aversion and measurement costs of the value of the product being developed. 
 
Table 11 – Marginal Effects from a Logistic Regression of 
Client and Researcher Market Cap on Early Dummy 
 
Dependent Variable: Early Dummy 
Independent Variable: (1) (2) (3) 
Log Client Mkt Cap 





Log Researcher Mkt Cap  
(millions of $) 
   -0.092 
(0.000) a 
 -0.142 
 (0.000) a 
Observations 112 102 55 
Pseudo R2 0.006 0.122 0.340 
Notes: p-values are in parentheses, a=significantly different from zero at the 1% significance 
level.  b= significantly different from zero at the 5% significance level, c= significantly different 
from zero at the 10% significance level. Any observation for which timing data was unknown 
was dropped. Acquisition deals were dropped. Only 55 observations simultaneously have data on 
timing, researcher market cap, and client market cap. 
 
The regressions in Table 11 use all deals for which timing data is known, which excludes 
acquisition deals.  The first regression utilizes log client market cap in millions as the 
independent variable, which is not very predictive. The second regression uses the log of 
researcher market cap in millions of dollars.  Log market cap was used rather than market 
cap because the probability of observing an early deal, given a smaller researcher market 




Regression three combines the independent variables.  The number of observations here 
is only 55 because there are only 55 observations for which both client and researcher 
market cap are simultaneously known.  Results are relatively significant, and Pseudo R2 is 
high.  The interpretation of the marginal effects result for log researcher market cap is 
that a 100% increase in researcher market cap will decrease the likelihood of observing 
an early deal by 14.2% when compared to a late deal.  As the client market cap increases 
by 100%, the likelihood of observing an early deal increases by 3.9%.   
 
The significance of the marginal effects of log researcher market cap are greater than 
those for log client market cap, and 100% change in researcher market cap has a greater 
effect on likelihood of observing an early deal than a 100% change in client market cap.  
These results agree with the model’s prediction9 that an early deal will be undertaken 
primarily due to the researcher’s cost of capital. 
 
Analysis - Type of Deal as a Function of Timing  
The model predicts that the type of deal will be partially determined by timing of deal 
{Deal(Timing(Rsize,e),e)}.  A researching firm will choose the timing of the deal based 
on its own cost of capital.  Other factors, such as firm-specific risk of failure, 
measurement costs, and how the drug or technology being considered will compliment or 
substitute other drugs, technologies, or pipelines currently help by the client firm, will 
weigh heavily in the decision of deal type, however these factors are not observed in my 
                                                           
9
 See the explanation of Table 2 and Table 10 for more on this model. 
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dataset. Because of the importance of some of these missing data, I regress deal type on 
timing, which is a function of researcher size, rather than simply regressing deal type on 
researcher size.  In this way, I capture some of the factors influencing timing that are not 
available in my dataset. 
 
Table 12 – Predicted Marginal Effects from a Multinomial Logistic Regression of 
Deal Type on Early Dummy 
Dependent Variable:  Deal Type 
 
Independent Variable:  
Co-development License Outsource Asset Purchase 
Early Dummy + - + - 
 
Table 12 presents the predictions of the results for the marginal effects from a logistic 
regression of deal type on the early dummy variable.  This is the prediction of deal type 
based on the observation of an early deal.  I expect to observe a positive coefficient for 
the early dummy when the dependant variable is co-development and outsource.  This is 
because co-development and outsource deals occur early in development of drugs and 
technologies. There exist two major reasons for co-development deals being likely to 
occur as early deals rather than late in phase testing.  First, the early deals involve 
products which are more likely to fail before approval than products in late deals, so the 
type of alliance made between the firms should align incentives in the face of high 
measurement costs.  Secondly, the researcher holds ownership of the human capital that 
created the product, so it would be more efficient for the researcher to continue early 
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phase development.  A co-development deal allows the researcher to continue 
development, but transfer intellectual property to the client later in development or 
testing. The results of the logistic regression should indicate a high likelihood that if an 
early deal is observed, the deal will be a co-development. 
 
I expect to observe a negative coefficient for license and asset purchase deal types. The 
client firm will be unlikely to license a product that is in the early stages of development 
since it is hard to measure the value of the product, and the product is probably not ready 
for use.  Asset purchases are similarly unlikely to occur in early stages, but the client may 
acquire some early stage products during the acquisition of a pipeline.  The other factors 
that determine whether a license or asset purchase is chosen are attributes of the client 
firm which are not observed in my dataset.  When creating or expanding a division, the 
client firm may choose an asset purchase of human and physical capital, as well as 
intellectual property. If completing a product and a patented piece is missing, then the 
model predicts that a license is more likely.  
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Table 13 – Average Marginal Effects from a Multinomial Logistic 
Regression of Deal Type on Timing 
Dependent Variable:  Deal Type (dummy) 
 














Pseudo R2 0.071 
Notes:  p-values are in parentheses,  a=significantly different from zero at the 1% significance level.  b= 
significantly different from zero at the 5% significance level, c= significantly different from zero at the 10% 
significance level. 
 
In Table 13 (columns 1-3), the marginal effects from a single multinomial logistic 
regression of deal type dummy variables on timing dummy variables are shown.  
Outsource deals were not used because of too few observations.  The results, except for 
R2, would be identical to four separate logistic regressions because deal type is mutually 
exclusive.  Observations used here are those for which timing data is known and for 
which one of the three main deal types listed is used. 
 
Observing an early deal indicates an increase in probability that the deal will be a co-
development deal by 35.5% (column 1) when compared to a late deal.  Observing an 
early deal decreases the probability that the deal will be a license or asset purchase, 




Analysis - Likelihood of Payment Types as a Function of Deal Type 
The model now predicts that payment types will be predicted by deal type  
{Payment(Deal(Timing(Rsize,e),e),e)}.  Again, due to the importance of some 
unavailable data, payment types are predicted from observed deal types, which capture 
the influence from the error terms from the prediction of timing. 
 
Table 14 – Predictions of Marginal Effects from Logistic Regression of  















Co-development + + - + + + - 
Asset Purchase + - - - - + 
Outsource + - - + - + - 
Early Dummy + + - + + - 
 
Predictions in Table 14 are made against the omitted variables license deals and late 
dummy.  The model predicts that the regression of equity payments on deal type will 
show that it is more likely to observe equity payments in co-development deals than any 
other deal type.  Equity is likely to be used when the value of the product is difficult to 
measure ex-ante, so is more likely to be used in early deals, which is more likely to be a 
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co-development deal.  It is difficult to predict whether equity will be used more often in 
license, asset purchase, or outsource deals.  Each of these deal types are not predicted to 
use equity payments in any systematic way, so significance of the results are predicted to 
be low.   
 
Royalty payments are expected to be used where the researcher maintains some residual 
claim. This is most often the case in license deals.  Co-development deals also contain a 
royalty component to give an incentive to produce a viable product.  The model presented 
in this paper therefore predicts that licenses and co-development deals will be more likely 
to be associated with royalty payments than outsource and asset purchase deals.  Since 
co-development deals are predicted to occur early, and license deals are predicted to 
occur late, it is difficult to predict a sign for the coefficient of timing. 
 
Milestone payments are predicted by the model to occur most often with co-development 
deals.  Co-development deals tend to be long-term deals which contract production which 
is costly to measure and monitor.  The model predicts that milestone payments tend to be 
a good contractual tool to reduce monitoring costs.  These payments may be used with 
license deals also, but it is predicted to be seen much less often with asset purchases, 
which should be associated with upfront payments.  Outsource deals may also have a 
milestone component, but because it is more likely to see a contracted research payment, 
it is hard to predict whether it is more or less likely to see a milestone component with 
outsource deals than license deals.  It is also difficult to predict whether milestone 
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payments occur early or late, since these payments can be used with several deal types, 
but the model predicts that these payments will tend to be early.     
 
Research payments are predicted to be observed with outsource deals more often than 
any other deal type.  These payments are not predicted to be observed with asset 
purchases, and rarely observed with licenses.  Outsource deals occur early, so the early 
dummy should have a positive coefficient. 
 
Upfront payments are expected to be used in asset purchase contracts more often than co-
development, outsource, or license deals.  Upfront payments are therefore predicted to 
occur late.  Because the seller maintains no residual claim when selling an asset, there 
should be no payment which contractually obligates the seller to complete any future 
work or receive any revenues after the initial cash payment. Because the upfront 
component of an outsource deal is called a research payment, upfront payments are 
predicted to occur less often with outsource deals. It is difficult to predict whether co-






Table 15 - Marginal Effects from Logistic Regression of Payment Type Dummy 
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Observations 216 209 216 177 216 
Pseudo R2 0.032 0.024 0.102 0.145 0.066 
Notes:  P-values are in parentheses, a=significantly different from zero at the 1% significance level.  b= significantly different 
from zero at the 5% significance level, c= significantly different from zero at the 10% significance level. 
 
 
The model predicts that the payments used in a deal will be a function of the deal type.  
The five logistic regressions in Table 15 are the regression of payment type dummy 
variables only on deal type and timing dummy variables.  I have included only deals for 
which the deal type was co-development, license, asset purchase, or outsource, of which 
there were 216.  Some regressions have less than 216 observations in the cases that some 
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observations were dropped due to perfect prediction of failure (no observations were 
found for asset purchases and research payments occurring together, or for outsource 
deals and royalty payments occurring together).   
 
For these five regressions (1-5), I have dropped the independent dummy variable for 
license deals.  Each regression presents the increase in probability, relative to the 
excluded variable (license deal dummy variable), that the payment type will be observed 
given that a certain deal type was observed.  For example, the cell in the top left shows 
that if a co-development deal is observed, it is 17.5% more likely that we will observe an 
equity payment than if a license deal were observed.   
 
The results agree with the predictions of the model.  Notable results are that royalties are 
predicted to occur early, due to so many early co-development deals using royalty 
payments.  Upfront payments are predicted to be used more often with co-development 
deals than with license deals in this dataset.   
 
Analysis – Acquisitions 
The following logit in Table 16 tests the probability of an acquisition occurring.  This is 
done by comparing the attributes of acquisition deals to non-acquisitions deals. The 
market cap of all firms in all deal types are included here, which is why the number of 
observations of market cap seen in Table 16 are at most 164, whereas in table 11, I had at 
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most 112 observations.  The fact that 164 firms of each type10 had information available 
on market cap is purely a coincidence, and not all of these observations overlap.  Only 98 
of these observations overlap. The “firm ratio” variable is the ratio of the potential 
purchaser to potential acquired firm in each individual deal. 
 
In the six logistic regressions of Table 16, I estimate the probability of an acquisition 
occurring (where the dependent variable, acquisition deal dummy, equals one) compared 
to an acquisition not occurring (acquisition dummy equal to zero).  The marginal effects 
therefore show the change in probability of an acquisition deal type occurring, given that 
there is some marginal change in the market cap of one of the firms.   
                                                           
10
 “firms of each type” refers to researchers and clients, which are referred to in the acquisitions section 
as “potential acquired firms” and “potential purchasers.” 
53 
 
Table 16 – Marginal Effects of Logistic Regression of Acquisition Deal Type  on 
Market Cap  
 
Dependent Variable: Acquisition Deal Dummy 
 
Independent Variable: 
 (1)   (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 





     
Potential Purchasing Firm 








Log Potential Acquired 
Market Cap 
($millions) 












Log Potential Purchasing 
Market Cap 
($millions) 






Observations 164 164 164 164 98 98 
Pseudo R2 0.017 0.004 0.079 0.005 0.132 0.160 
Notes:  P-values are in parentheses, a=significantly different from zero at the 1% significance level.  b= significantly different from 
zero at the 5% significance level, c= significantly different from zero at the 10% significance level. 
 
 The marginal effects from the first logit (regression 1) show that as the potential 
acquired firm’s market cap rises by $10 billion, it is 4.8% less likely to be involved in an 
acquisition, which agrees with my hypothesis.  The pseudo R2 and the significance level 
are low, however.  Logging the potential acquired firm’s market cap (regression 3) gives 
a more significant result and higher R2, showing that this is not a linear relationship.  
Adding logged potential purchaser market cap and ratio of potential purchaser market cap 
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to logged potential acquired firm’s market cap (regression 5) brings the R2 to 0.132.  
Using potential purchaser market cap rather than logged potential purchaser market cap 
has more explanatory power, so in regression 6, this is used.  Pseudo R2 is high, and 
potential purchaser market cap, as well as the logged potential acquired firm’s market 
cap, have significant results.  In this regression, we are left with only 98 observations for 
which all variables are available.   
 
In regression 6, an increase in firm market cap of the purchaser of 100 billion dollars 
increases the likelihood of observing an acquisition by 13.4*10 -5 %.  In Table 17, we see 
that the largest purchasers are over 200 billion dollars in market cap.  With a marginal 
effect this small, the purchaser’s size seems to play a very small role in the likelihood of 
observing an acquisition deal.  
 
The high significance of the log of the potential acquired firm’s market cap in regression 
6 is evidence that a very small firm is more likely to be acquired.  To be more specific, as 
the size of the researcher rises by 100%, the probability of observing a firm being 
acquired compared to not being acquired, but instead some other type of deal occurring, 
falls by 9%.   
 
Larger firms are less likely to be acquired than engage in another type of deal.  There are 
two reasons for seeing this result.  First, it is expensive to acquire another firm, and the 
larger the firm, the larger the opportunity cost of the capital invested in buying the other 
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firm.  The second reason is that a larger firm is more likely to have several projects going 
on, many of which the purchaser may not be interested.  In the case of a larger 
researching firm, the client may choose to purchase some specific assets of that firm 
rather than the entire firm.  This is the acquisition of some combination of human capital, 
physical capital, and intellectual property.   
 
Table 17 - Summary Statistics for Firms Involved in Acquisitions 
 












46 2172.67 85.25 8435.93 1.5 52470.11 
 
Due to cost of capital, it is unlikely that a small firm would acquire a large firm. Of the 
46 acquisitions in the dataset, 42 of the acquisitions were of biotechs, and 4 were of 
pharma.  Of those 4 pharma, 3 were acquired by another pharma, and one relatively small 
pharma was acquired by a relatively large biotech.  This is an acquisition of product 
pipelines and human and physical capital.  By acquiring the entire pipeline and all 
licenses held by the acquired firm, the purchasing firm can ensure that they hold all 
relevant information and future patents that would be put out by that firm.  In the case 
that the purchasing firm did not purchase the entire firm, but rather an asset from the 
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firm, the researching firm may have residual research and human capital, providing the 
ability to create new licenses that trump the old ones.  The acquisition of the researcher 
prevents this hazard.  In addition, the purchase of the pipeline may add to the knowledge 
base of the client firm, creating knowledge spillover. 
 
Large firms may acquire the pipeline and intellectual property of smaller firms to use the 
technology in multiple sectors of their development programs.  Buying another firm’s 
development program for one drug may prove profitable, depending on cost of capital 
and economies of scope, but this technology may prove useful in other areas of the 
purchasing firm’s production line.  In this case, it may be profitable to buy the technology 
of entire firm. The purchase of intellectual property from another firm may prevent the 
need to reproduce that research and development in-house.  Using a single technology in 
multiple pipeline drugs or technologies could be compared to the use of one engine or 
transmission in several cars by General Motors or Ford Motor Company.  David Seltzer, 
President and CEO of Hi-Tech Pharmacal, stated in a press release in Business wire on 
December 31, 2007, that "This acquisition expands Hi-Tech's product line, broadens our 
dosage form offerings, brings us into new therapeutic categories, adds to the Company's 
growing pipeline of products and brings experienced management. We believe that the 
acquisition will be accretive to earnings and cash flow positive in the first year."11 
                                                           
11





With a sample of 270 strategic alliances, this research introduces a model to predict 
efficient contracting of a strategic alliance’s timing, payment structure, and organization.  
The model predicts that the size of the researching firm dictates its cost of capital, and a 
high cost of capital will induce the researcher to sell the intellectual property sooner than 
a larger researcher would.  The timing of the deal is then used by the model to predict the 
type of deal that will occur.  Co-development and outsource deals will be observed to 
occur early, while asset purchases and licenses will occur in late deals.  The deal type 
then carries some information about both the nature of the deal and the timing of the deal, 
so payment types are predicted from deal type.  Some combination of equity, royalty, 
milestone, research, and upfront payments will be used to reduce the monitoring costs to 
the client.   
 
The model predicts that small researching firms, with high cost of capital, will be inclined 
to form a co-development alliance with larger firms, which have lower costs of capital 
but higher shirking costs.  The small firm will efficiently produce research, and then sell 
the intellectual property when the marginal cost of procuring capital has exceeded the 
marginal benefit.  The larger firm will finish late stage development and testing with low 
cost capital, then take advantage of economies of scale and scope to cost effectively 
manufacture, market and distribute the product.  Larger client firms, with the lowest cost 
of capital, will be more willing to undertake riskier (earlier stage) investments.  Larger 
58 
 
client firms will therefore be observed taking part in earlier deals with smaller researcher 
firms.   
 
In the case that the product is very hard to measure due to asymmetric information, or the 
researching firm is very large, the product may not be sold until late phase testing or even 
after approval.  In this case, the deal type is more likely to be a license or asset purchase 
rather than co-development. The differences between co-development and license or 
asset purchases are timing of the deal and the payment types used.  The payment types 
used in co-development deals are chosen to align incentives in order to efficiently 
produce research and development without incurring high monitoring costs.  In license 
and asset purchases, the products are complete or near complete, so monitoring payments 
are not needed.  Cash payments can be used to transfer the intellectual property from 
researcher to client without leaving a residual claim to the researcher.  Paying the 
researcher a royalty, however, provides incentive for the researcher to provide a valuable 
product and reduces incentive for the researcher to create a better product, which would 
devalue the one which was sold to the client. 
 
Acquisitions are treated separately here due to the differing structure of the deal and lack 
of a timing component.  This deal type is used to fill gaps in a larger firm’s research 
pipeline and solve a monitoring problem.  In the case that a firm has gaps in its research 
pipeline, it may choose to buy the pipeline from another firm.  This decreases the 
purchaser’s inefficiency of holding idle resources or the buying and selling of human and 
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physical capital.  By acquiring the entire firm, the purchaser acquires all intellectual 
property and human capital.  This ends competition from that firm, decreasing probability 
that the acquired pipeline will be trumped by a new product.  When the researcher is a 
small firm, it is relatively cheap to buy the entire firm.  The analysis in this paper 
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